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 It has been nearly a decade since Justice Anthony Kennedy lent 
his important voice to the growing concern over the injustice of man-
datory minimum sentences.1  It was a watershed moment to hear a 
Supreme Court Justice who joined the opinion upholding California’s 
“three strikes law” criticize the precise practice that he had previously 
concluded was constitutional.2
 
†
 Executive Director of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(NACDL), the nation’s criminal defense bar association.  Prior to assuming this posi-
tion, Mr. Reimer was a practicing criminal defense attorney in New York City for nearly 
three decades, most recently with the firm of Gould Reimer Walsh Goffin & Cohn.  
  In the years since, commentators, legal 
scholars, and even politicians from across the political spectrum have 
increasingly expressed dismay at the pervasive injustice inflicted by 
decades of increasingly draconian sentencing policies.  The raw num-
†† 
President of NACDL.  Ms. Wayne practices criminal defense in Colorado at the 
Law Offices of Lisa Wayne, where she represents individuals and corporations accused 
of crime at all stages in both federal and state courts around the country.  
1
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Ad-
dress at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting 4 (Aug. 9, 2003), (available at 
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CR209800/newsletterpubs/ 
Justice_Kennedy_ABA_Speech_Final.pdf (“I can accept neither the necessity nor the 
wisdom of federal mandatory minimum sentences.  In too many cases, mandatory min-
imum sentences are unwise and unjust.”). 
2
See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003). 
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bers of incarcerated persons in America are universally startling.3  For 
some, they are nothing less than a national embarrassment, particular-
ly in light of the undeniably disparate impact on minorities.4
Since mandatory minimum sentences first came into vogue, crim-
inal defense practitioners have observed firsthand the heartbreak and 
misery that they foster.  Any discussion of mandatory minimum sen-
tences in the United States must focus on the role of drug sentences.
 
5  
Seldom is there a true correlation between a client’s criminality and 
the punishment when a difference of years, and sometimes decades, 
of a person’s life is determined by arbitrary thresholds.6
At every stage of the criminal justice process, mandatory mini-
mums contribute to disparate impact among racial groups.
  Mandatory 
minimums are merely accelerants that exaggerate the types of law en-
forcement practices that foster as much crime as they prevent and 
convert low-level offenders into career criminals.  They squander pre-
cious resources and undermine public confidence in our justice sys-
tem, especially in poor and disadvantaged communities. 
7
 
3
Over 1.5 million people are incarcerated in state and federal prisons.  Heather 
C. West et al., Prisoners in 2009, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., Dec. 2010, at 1, available 
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf.  This number does not include 
those held by local or municipal authorities.  See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100:  
BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 7 (2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/ 
uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf (stating that there are 
1,596,127 adults in prison in the United States and an additional 723,131 in jail). 
  They en-
4
Black and Hispanic men and women are incarcerated at much higher rates than 
whites.  See West, supra note 3, app. tbls.13-15.  
5
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING FEDERAL MAN-
DATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING PENALTIES 1 (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov 
/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Submissions
/20090710_StC_Mandatory_Minimum.pdf (finding that, in fiscal year 2008, there were 
31,239 counts of conviction that carried a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, 
and of which 24,789, or 79.4 percent, were for drug offenses).  
6
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2006) (setting mandatory minimums of 
five and ten years for manufacture, possession, or sale of narcotics).  Most states also 
have harsh mandatory minimums and determinate sentences.  The authors have ex-
tensive experience with the mandatory minimums in Colorado and New York.  New 
York led the way four decades ago with the infamous “Rockefeller drug law,” which 
punished the sale of as little as two ounces with a prison term of fifteen years to life, 
with no possibility of parole prior to service of the minimum.  See N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 220.43 (McKinney 2011); see also id. § 70.00 (3)(a)(i) (“For a class A-I felony, such 
minimum period shall not be less than fifteen years nor more than twenty-five years . . . 
.”); id. § 70.00(1)–(2) (providing for the mandatory life maximum).  
7
See SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM:  A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingracialdisparity.pdf 
(“One fundamental aspect of this marginalization is the disparate treatment of per-
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courage policing practices, investigative techniques, and prosecutorial 
strategies that are illogical, counterintuitive, and sometimes arbitrary 
and abusive.  The ultimate example of how mandatory minimums 
have fostered prosecutorial excess is the unfettered prosecutorial dis-
cretion to disregard those minimums for so-called cooperators. 
This essay provides a practitioner’s view of how mandatory mini-
mum sentences diminish fairness and contribute to arbitrary justice.  
Most importantly, prosecutors’ unlimited power to procure informa-
tion and testimony by bargaining away those minimums has created a 
bizarre, alternate universe in which the worst behavior, by both law 
enforcement and the accused, often garners the greatest reward.  Fi-
nally, this essay suggests that significant reform may be accomplished 
if we simply restore judicial authority to assess independently whether, 
in light of all the circumstances, a person’s post-arrest conduct merits 
a departure from a mandatory sentence. 
I.  MANDATORY MINIMUMS ARE PERVASIVE, AND MINORITY POPULATIONS 
ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY SUBJECTED TO THEM 
The U.S. criminal code has exploded in recent decades.  There 
are now well over 4400 federal criminal penalties and many more that 
arise from agency regulations.8  Along with the overall expansion of 
federal criminal penalties, there has been a surge in mandatory min-
imum sentences.9  Most states have followed suit, enacting mandatory 
guidelines, specific mandatory minimums, and determinate sentences 
without the possibility of early release.10
The most prevalent mandatory penalties are in the areas that most af-
fect low-income, disadvantaged populations:  controlled substance of-
 
 
sons of color which occurs incrementally across the entire spectrum of America’s 
criminal justice system.”). 
8
BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND. & NAT’L ASS’N OF 
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, WITHOUT INTENT:  HOW CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL 
INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW 5 (2010), available at http://www.nacdl.org/ 
criminaldefense.aspx?id=10287&terms=withoutintent. 
9
For a chart of federal mandatory minimums for drug trafficking offenses, see 
Federal Trafficking Penalties, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/ 
dea/agency/penalties.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).  
10
Cf. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. Law No. 103-
322, § 20102(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1816 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13702) (pro-
viding financial incentives for states to increase prison sentences under the original 
Truth in Sentencing grant program).   
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fenses, weapons offenses, and illegal reentry.11  Far and away, the biggest 
drivers of this trend have been the so-called war on drugs and the na-
tion’s infatuation with lengthy incarceration as the perceived antidote to 
drug abuse, without any constitutional limitation on those sentences.12
While there is considerable debate about whether controlled sub-
stance offenses are in fact more prevalent in minority communities, or 
whether the societal decision to concentrate policing resources in 
those areas distorts crime statistics—creating an illusion of greater 
abuse by minorities—the irrefutable fact is that our prisons are dis-
proportionately filled with minority drug offenders.
 
13  Many commen-
tators have argued that in America’s largest city, the last two New York 
mayors—whose tenure spans nearly a generation—have implemented 
policing policies that target minority populations.14
 
11
See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (setting criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed 
aliens); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (setting penalties for federal firearms offenses); 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b) (setting penalties for federal narcotics offenses). 
 
12
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 (1991) (upholding a 
mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the possession of 
650 grams of cocaine). 
13
See David Rudovsky, A Closing Keynote:  A Comment on Mass Incarceration in the 
United States, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 207, 210-11 (2008) (noting the disproportionate 
number of African-Americans in prison and questioning whether our country over-
incarcerates minorities); see also Hearing on the Impact of Mandatory Minimum Penalties in 
Federal Sentencing before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 6-7 (May 27, 2010) (statement of 
Marc Mauer, Executive Director, The Sentencing Project), available at http://www. 
ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100527/T
estimony_Mauer_Sentencing_Project.pdf (“As a wealth of documentation has shown, 
the drug war has had extremely disproportionate effects on African American com-
munities.”); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).    
14
See HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE:  RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY 1997–
2007, at 6 (2008), available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/MARIJUANA-ARREST-
CRUSADE_Final.pdf (noting that the “marijuana arrest campaign” is especially harm-
ful to “Black and Latino young people and their families”); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Da-
vies, Street Stops and Broken Windows:  Terry, Race and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 457, 462 (2000) (“[T]he implementation of Broken Windows policies 
was disproportionately concentrated in minority neighborhoods and conflated with 
poverty and other signs of socio-economic disadvantage.”); Memorandum from Harry 
G. Levine, Professor of Sociology, Queens Coll. & City Univ. of N.Y., to the New York 
Senate 2 (June 15, 2010), available at http://dragon.soc.qc.cuny.edu/Staff/ 
levine/Testimony-Memo-NYS-Senate-Marijuana-Arrests-June-2011.pdf (“The arrests 
unjustly target young African Americans and Latinos and their neighborhoods.”). 
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II.  LAW ENFORCEMENT TACTICS EXPLOIT MANDATORY MINIMUMS  
TO INDUCE AND EXAGGERATE CRIMINALITY 
Law enforcement tactics have changed dramatically over the past 
several decades.  Gone are the days when the police emphasized 
solving crimes and catching the perpetrators.  Today the emphasis is 
on undercover police work, premised upon deception and depen-
dent upon a network of informants.  The widespread use of under-
cover and sting operations to foment the actual commission of crime 
is a relatively new phenomenon, and the inclusion of “CI” or “CS” 
(confidential informants or confidential sources) is ubiquitous in 
modern-day indictments. 
The use of undercover operations—with law enforcement officers 
posing as criminals, and cooperating criminal defendants participat-
ing as active facilitators—is now a staple of law enforcement on both 
the state and federal levels.15  This activity is not limited to surveillance 
and prevention; officers actively engage in the facilitation of criminal 
activity.16  Undercover agents and informants encourage others to 
commit offenses, either by providing resources or markets,17 acting as 
decoys or potential victims, or otherwise providing opportunities for 
criminal activity that may never have occurred but for the law en-
forcement operation.18  The entrapment defense is an ineffective 
check on these practices because the legal hurdle for establishing the 
defense is so high.19
 
15
See Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It:  Undercover Police Participation in 
Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 161 (2009) (“Investigative deception is a firmly entrenched 
aspect of contemporary American policing.”).   
  And the areas that law enforcement often targets 
16
Id. at 164-65.   
17
We have seen these kinds of tactics on high visibility cases from ABSCAM to 
Operation Fast and Furious.  ABSCAM was a 1970s FBI-initiated sting operation in 
which federal agents posing as foreign officials met and bribed U.S. congressmen in a 
confabulated public corruption scandal.  FBI Presses on Corruption, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2006, at A6.  “Fast & Furious” refers to the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms, and Explosives’ (ATF) sting operation in which ATF agents posing as 
illegal gun-runners sold high-powered weapons to Mexican drug cartels, thousands of 
which were lost.  Some of these weapons were later linked to the shooting deaths of 
American law enforcement agents.  ATF’s Fast and Furious Scandal, L.A. TIMES, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/atf-fast-furious-sg,0,3828090. 
storygallery (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (compiling articles about the scandal). 
18
See Joh, supra note 15, at 165 (“Facilitative operations also raise the serious issue 
of crime amplification:  the possibility that the very undercover investigation meant to 
catch criminals in the act may actually produce more crime.”). 
19
To establish entrapment under federal law and in a majority of states, the de-
fendant must demonstrate that she was not personally disposed to commit the offense.  
“It is only when the Government’s deception actually implants the criminal design in 
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tend to be poor and disadvantaged.  Thus, cooperating defendants 
are turned loose in those communities to troll for new cases. 
A. Sentencing Entrapment 
Practitioners routinely encounter several phenomena as a result of 
these practices.  Armed with the knowledge that mandatory minimums 
exert great pressure upon accused suspects, law enforcement employs 
practices that amplify criminal activity.  One practice, known as “sen-
tencing entrapment” or “sentencing manipulation,” has become com-
mon practice, especially as a sequela to the war on drugs,20 and there 
are many reported cases in which these practices have been upheld.21
Here is a typical example, based on the authors’ experience with a 
real case.  Anthony C., a young working man in New York, became a 
cocaine abuser.  To support his habit, he sold minimal quantities to a 
friend.  Unknown to him, his friend was arrested and faced prosecu-
tion under New York’s harsh Rockefeller drug law.
 
22
This scenario is commonplace.  With mandatory minimums trig-
gered by arbitrary thresholds, there is an irresistible temptation not to 
simply catch a person committing a crime, but also to make every ef-
fort to ratchet the offense up so that law enforcement will have the 
  Law enforce-
ments agents told Anthony’s friend that if he wanted to avoid a man-
datory penalty, then he would have to help make a case involving a 
more serious offense.  After agreeing to cooperate, the friend—
operating under the aegis of law enforcement—again sought to pur-
chase cocaine from Anthony.  Only this time, he said he had a cousin 
who wanted more than Anthony had ever sold.  Anthony repeatedly 
refused.  The friend was not dissuaded.  He declined to buy the small 
amount and kept imploring Anthony to sell him at least two ounces.  
Eventually Anthony agreed.  The cousin was an undercover officer, 
and Anthony now faced a minimum of fifteen years to life. 
 
the mind of the defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into play.”  United 
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973).   A prior criminal conviction, especially for 
the same or similar offense, will be admissible in evidence and will almost certainly 
make it impossible for the accused to prevail.  The Supreme Court has held that en-
trapment hinges on a defendant’s state of mind, thereby opening the door to prior 
criminal conduct.  Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1988).  See generally 
Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Modern Status of the Law Concerning Entrapment to Commit 
Narcotics Offenses, 22 A.L.R. FED. 731 (2011). 
20
Derrick Augustus Carter, To Catch the Lion, Tether the Goat:  Entrapment, Conspira-
cy, and Sentencing Manipulation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 135, 151 (2009).   
21
See id. at 137-38 nn.9-13 (listing cases). 
22
See supra note 6. 
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power to crush the accused with the possibility of decades in prison.  
And mandatory penalties for repeat offenders provide a similar in-
ducement to target those with a criminal history.  Because these tech-
niques are largely beyond regulation or judicial oversight,23 the extent 
to which it can be definitively established that they promote racial dis-
parity requires further inquiry by scholars,24
B. Aggregation of Charges 
 but for anyone who spends 
a day in a metropolitan courtroom, the disparate impact is apparent. 
Another favored tactic among prosecutors is the aggregation of 
charges against multiple defendants alleging a massive conspiracy with 
criminal conduct far greater than anything engaged in by many of the 
individuals.  Typically the government will indict many individuals 
who are aligned very loosely, if at all.  Often the unifying commonality 
in the massive conspiracy will simply be that they are from the same 
neighborhood, or even a single block.  The many defendants, some-
times numbering in dozens, will often include a compilation of bit 
players.  By aggregating the criminality, higher mandatory minimums 
apply, vastly increasing the stakes for the individual accused. 
For example, there is currently pending in the Southern District 
of New York a sixty-defendant drug conspiracy case, originally alleging 
a conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine.25  Some 
of the defendants are alleged gang members, charged with acts of vi-
olence, but most are not.26  Some allegedly sold significant quantities 
of drugs, but most only minimal amounts.27  The case illustrates how 
wantonly the government uses mandatory minimums to extract guilty 
pleas.  The government forced most defendants to either plead guilty 
to the ten-year count or face additional charges, including the filing of 
prior felony information that will double the mandatory minimum 
and increase the penalty to life for others.28
 
23
See Joh, supra note 
  Some defendants took 
the plea immediately, some agreed to plead but encountered delays in 
15, at 168-80 (summarizing applicable state and federal con-
straints that ostensibly serve as a check on law enforcement). 
24
Id. at 197. 
25
See United States v. Boykin, No. 10-0391, 2011 WL 2419877 (S.D.N.Y June 7, 
2011) (ruling on the defendants’ various pretrial motions). 
26
Id. at *1-2. 
27
Id. at *3. 
28
This information originated from the authors’ personal communication with 
defense attorneys involved.  
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setting plea hearings based on court congestion, scheduling conflicts, 
etc., and some refused the plea outright. 
While this colossal case was pending, Congress passed the Fair 
Sentencing Act, reducing the penalties for crack cocaine by substitut-
ing an 18:1 ratio between crack and cocaine for the prior 100:1 ratio.29  
In July 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memorandum di-
recting that the new provisions should be applied retroactively to de-
fendants sentenced after August 3, 2010.30  Those who pled guilty to 
the fifty-plus gram conspiracy but who, for myriad reasons, had not yet 
been sentenced get the benefit of the reduced penalty, will face five 
years instead of ten.  One such defendant, Naquan Gayle, was en-
meshed in the conspiracy because of a low-level drug sale.  Because he 
was sentenced just ten days before Attorney General Holder an-
nounced the new retroactive policy, he was sentenced to ten years.  
Another defendant in the case, who was originally scheduled to be 
sentenced before Mr. Gayle, benefited from the reduction because his 
attorney had other commitments necessitating the adjournment of 
the sentence until after August 3.31  He, unlike Mr. Gayle, stands to re-
ceive the five-year sentence.32
But what really underscores how tyrannically mandatory minimum 
sentences are employed is the way in which the government acted to-
ward those defendants who had not yet pled when the reduced penal-
ties were enacted and the Holder memo was published.  In a flash, the 
government procured a superseding indictment of the remaining de-
fendants, raising the amount of drugs charged to satisfy the ten-year 
mandatory minimum—this time alleging a 280-gram conspiracy—and 
securing a renewed deadline to either plead guilty to that charge or 
face the prior felony information. 
 
 
29
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified in 
scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.). 
30
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder Jr., Attorney Gen. of the U.S, to all Federal 
Prosecutors (July 15, 2011), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/Holder%20FSA% 
20memo%207.15.11.pdf. 
31
See Motion to Vacate Sentence and Resentence Pursuant to Fair Sentencing Act 
of 2010 at 18-19, Boykin, No. 10-0391 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2011).  As of the date of this 
writing, the government has declined to afford him the benefit of the reduced penalty, 
and his attorney has moved to vacate the sentence on due process and equal protec-
tion grounds. 
32
Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2006) (setting the mandatory minimum 
sentence for cocaine convictions). 
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C. The “Look Back” Conspiracy Cycle 
Another way in which mandatory minimums are abused federally 
is through the use of “look back” conspiracies.  In this scenario, the 
government uses information from cooperating defendants to bring 
charges against individuals who at some point are alleged to have par-
ticipated with those defendants in their criminal activities. 
For example, Reynaldo C. was charged as a co-conspirator in a 
multi-defendant case.33  He faced a ten-year minimum and the possi-
bility of twenty years if the government filed a prior-felony informa-
tion.  And there was not much doubt that he would be convicted, be-
cause one of the acts specified in the conspiracy was a drug crime to 
which he had already pled guilty in state court more than a year be-
fore the pending action.  In fact, not only had he pled guilty, but he 
had also served time, and was in a treatment program well before the 
federal “look back” indictment.  Reynaldo not only thrived in that pro-
gram, but he was also using his own experience to help others over-
come drug abuse.  Though Reynaldo had already been punished and 
was back on his feet—and notwithstanding the fact that he had indisput-
ably not committed any criminal act since he was arrested by the state—
the government used the mandatory minimum to coerce a guilty plea.34
All of these tactics exaggerate criminality and turn the criminal 
justice system into a powerful engine of conviction, sweeping up 
masses of low-level offenders and filling our prisons with long-term 
inmates.
 
35
 
33
Information originated from author’s personal experiences in criminal defense. 
  This use of mandatory minimum sentences is a strange way 
to dispense justice.  But there is yet another aspect of the system that 
imbues prosecutors with unfettered authority to use mandatory mini-
mums as an instrument of coercion that fuels mass incarceration:  the 
power to dispense with them for “cooperators.” 
34
The authors do not use the word “coerce” lightly.   When the prosecution tells a 
defendant to plead guilty or face a geometrically greater term of imprisonment, one 
that may result in decades of imprisonment, if convicted after trial, it is coercion—
although law enforcement and the law may not recognize it as such.  Ordinary people 
do not view it any other way. 
35
As the prison census confirms, the inmates are disproportionately minority 
populations.  See supra text accompanying notes 4 and 7. 
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III.  “SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE” BREEDS SUBSTANTIAL INJUSTICE:  
COOPERATION BEFORE AND AFTER ENACTMENT OF THE SENTENCING 
REFORM ACT OF 1984 AND THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986 
Prior to the enactment of the federal sentencing guidelines and 
anti-drug laws in the mid-1980s, the determination as to whether and 
to what extent a federal defendant deserved a reduction in sentence 
was entrusted to the sentencing judge.  The vehicle for such a reduc-
tion was Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
provided that a court could reduce a sentence within 120 days after 
the imposition of the sentence or within 120 days of the completion of 
the appellate process.36
Under this procedure, the court reviewed all of the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the defendant’s cooperation.  The proce-
dure afforded the defense an opportunity to show the court that the 
client had made every effort to assist the government, had fully se-
vered her ties with criminal associates, and had complied with every 
request made by the government.  Even where the cooperation did 
not bear fruit, a court could ameliorate the sentence in recognition of 
the defendant’s good faith efforts.
  This rule provided a vehicle for those defen-
dants who sought to cooperate with the government to have the 
court consider the nature and extent of the cooperation and adjust 
the sentence accordingly.  Typically, the defendant made the motion 
within the 120-day period following sentencing, and the court held 
the motion under advisement for an indeterminate period until the 
cooperation was concluded. 
37
Federal sentencing reductions, including those that vitiate manda-
tory minimums, are now governed by United States Sentencing Guide-
line § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).  These provisions stripped the 
courts of their authority to recognize a defendant’s good faith efforts 
to cooperate.  Instead, the power to unlock the steel door of a manda-
tory minimum was vested with the prosecution, and the standard for 
the exercise of that power became the prosecutors’ subjective deter-
mination that the defendant’s assistance was “substantial.”
 
38
 
36
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1976). 
  This 
37
See, e.g., United States v. Unterman, 433 F. Supp. 647, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (re-
ducing a defendant’s prison sentence by more than one-half even though the value of 
the cooperation was not known, because the Court “believe[d] credit should be given 
for the sincerity of defendant’s attempts at cooperation”). 
38
For a narrow category of controlled substance offenses, Congress enacted a pro-
vision commonly referred to as the “safety valve.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006); U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 (2011).  It authorizes a sentence below a 
REIMERWAYNE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  12:05 PM 
2011] From the Practioner’s Perch 169 
represents one of the most profound changes in federal sentencing 
law, amplified immeasurably by the interplay with mandatory mini-
mums.  It has radically altered the nation’s criminal justice system, 
causing arbitrary, irrational, and unreliable justice. 
Under these provisions, the defendant has no power to seek a re-
duction in sentence for cooperation.  A reduction below a mandatory 
minimum may be granted only if the government moves for it, and 
only if the government asserts that the defendant provided substantial 
assistance.39  Exceptions to this extraordinary prosecutorial discretion 
have been recognized only in rare circumstances.40
In the era before harsh mandatory sentencing provisions, stem-
ming either from the pre-Booker
  The consequences 
of this new regime cannot be overstated. 
41 guidelines or statutory mandatory 
minimum sentences, cooperation was relatively rare.  Today it has be-
come as common as sunrise and sunset.42
 
statutory minimum for nonviolent drug offenders with a minimal criminal history if 
they did not play a leading role in the offense.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).  The defendant 
must also truthfully disclose to the government all information pertinent to the of-
fense.  Id.  It does not require substantial assistance, nor a motion by the government.  
Id.  The provision requires that the imposed sentence be consistent with the autho-
rized guideline, which is highly problematic because the guideline is often pegged to 
the mandatory minimum.  For example, the base offense level for controlled sub-
stance offenses that carry a mandatory minimum of five years imprisonment is 26, 
which provides for a range of 63 to 78 months, and the level for those that carry a 
mandatory minimum of ten years is 32, which provides for a range of 121–151 
months.  See 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2006) (providing the drug quantity levels 
for five- and ten-year minimums); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c), 
drug quantity tbl. (listing the base offense levels for various drug quantities); see also 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (setting the 
ranges for base offense levels 26 and 32).  
  It is not surprising.  Extra-
39
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (stating that this provision 
applies “[u]pon motion of the government”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (same). 
40
Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (holding that “federal dis-
trict courts have authority to review a prosecutor’s refusal to file a substantial-assistance 
motion and to grant a remedy if they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitu-
tional motive”; that is, “if the prosecutor’s refusal to move was not rationally related to 
any legitimate Government end.”); see also Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discre-
tion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 
112 n.20, 130-49 (1994) (discussing attempts to eliminate or circumvent the gov-
ernment motion requirement).  
41
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
42
For example, in fiscal year 2010, 18.5 percent of offenders convicted of an of-
fense carrying a mandatory minimum were relieved of the penalty for substantial assis-
tance.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS:  MANDATORY MINIMUM PE-
NALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 133 figs.7-8 (2011), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_
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ordinarily harsh mandatory penalties leave the accused with little 
choice but to consider cooperation.  Twenty-five years ago, after a law-
yer came into a case, completed an initial review, and perhaps had 
some discussions with the prosecutor about the available plea offer, he 
would outline two options:  the client’s prospects at trial and the 
probable sentencing range if convicted, or the probable sentencing 
range if the client accepted a prosecutor’s plea offer.  Rarely was co-
operation a consideration, except in those few cases where the gov-
ernment needed assistance to identify a major accomplice or to solve 
a particularly heinous crime. 
Today, a lawyer must explain three options:  the first two, plus co-
operation.  While cooperation was always an option to ameliorate the 
prospect of a harsh sentence, the risks now are so dramatic that it is 
essentially malpractice not to explore that option with a client.  And 
while in the past a lawyer knew that a client’s good faith efforts to 
cooperate could lead to a lesser sentence, now the lawyer knows that 
earnest and sincere efforts alone are worthless. 
IV.  REAL WORLD DISTORTIONS CAUSED BY THE PROSECUTOR’S 
CONTROL OF THE COOPERATION OPTION 
The combustible mix of draconian sentences and unbridled pro-
secutorial discretion has led to bizarre consequences.  This is the real 
world of cooperation from the defense perspective. 
A. The Race to the Prosecutor’s Door 
One of the first phenomena evident under the cooperation re-
gime is the “race to the prosecutor’s office.”43
 
Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.cfm.  
There is no data on how many tried to cooperate but did not qualify.  
  The fear that a co-
defendant may provide the same information first creates a strong in-
centive for the accused to rush to offer cooperation.  In what other 
context would any rational person make a life-altering decision with-
out sober deliberation?  How can an attorney assess a case and identify 
litigable issues when delay may cost the client the one opportunity to 
avoid years in prison?  But that is precisely what happens.  There may 
be sixty defendants at the initial presentment; by the next appearance, 
only fifty-five, and at the next fifty-two, and so on.  Where are they dis-
appearing to?  They have lined up to seek the cooperation departure. 
43
Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 
15 (2010). 
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This process reeks of arbitrariness.  The lawyer who cautions pa-
tience, believing that she does not know enough to accurately assess 
the case and effectively advise the client, may irrevocably lose the co-
operation opportunity for her client.  Another, who is engaged in a 
separate case, may suffer the same outcome merely because of the 
prior commitment.  Because the test is “substantial assistance,” it is 
likely, if not certain, that if the prosecutor has already received the in-
formation from another source, then a tardy offer to cooperate will 
not meet that criterion.  That is what happened in the case of Reynaldo 
C.  By the time of the federal charges, he was on a new path, and any 
offer of assistance was too late.  While haste may make waste in most sit-
uations, when it comes to cooperation, delay may lead to disaster.44
B. Too Low to Know 
 
What happens when an accused is at such a low level in the enter-
prise that he has no useful information, and the only individual he 
can implicate either is already convicted or has such a solid case 
against him that the government does not need assistance?  This is 
one of the most common and heartbreaking scenarios.45  One of the 
early cases upholding the constitutionality of the substantial assistance 
criterion involved just such a person.46  Victoria Severich faced a man-
datory minimum after her arrest for possession of cocaine secreted on 
her body at an airport.47  Despite her best efforts to cooperate, she was 
denied a departure motion because she could not provide informa-
tion sufficient to lead to the arrest of another.48
 
44
This system also contributes to serious ethical dilemmas for practicing attorneys.  
Various professional standards require that an attorney conduct sufficient inquiry and 
investigation before counseling a client to enter a guilty plea.  See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS:  DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS § 4-6.1 (2011), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_ 
archive/crimjust_standards_dfunc_blk.html#4.1. 
 
45
See Luna & Cassell, supra note 43, at 15 (“Unlike those in leadership positions, 
low-level offenders often lack the type of valuable information that can be used as a 
bargaining chip with prosecutors.”) 
46
United States v. Severich, 676 F. Supp. 1209, 1213-14 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
47
Id. at 1210. 
48
Id. at 1214. 
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C.  To the Most Culpable Go the Greatest Benefits 
Consider the case of Demetric Savoy, in which racial profiling al-
most certainly played a pivotal role in his initial stop.49  Mr. Savoy and 
two companions, one male and one female, were arrested in a New 
York train station.50  The female was found in possession of crack co-
caine.  She immediately implicated the other male.  Within days, the 
other male offered to cooperate with the government.  He told the 
government that Demetric Savoy had transported drugs on several oc-
casions, enabling the government to aggregate the weight to trigger 
the ten-year mandatory minimum.  Mr. Savoy, who had one prior mis-
demeanor charge, maintained his innocence and went to trial.  He 
lost.  The cooperating co-defendant, who had two prior narcotics fe-
lony convictions, received time served, spending less than one year in 
jail.  Mr. Savoy received a sentence of sixteen years.51
Whether or not the cooperating defendant was truthful, is there 
any justice or rationality in a system that permits the prosecution to 
wield its enormous power to allow a three-time felon to bargain for his 
freedom while a first-time felon is condemned to prison for sixteen 
times as long?  Yet this has become routine.  For example, one of the 
authors handled a case in which the admitted shooter in a homicide 
cooperated, served only six years, and then agreed to testify against an 
alleged accomplice—ten years after the shooting.  This wanton use of 
cooperation is a prime engine for the incarceration of the disadvan-
taged.  Since the most culpable have the most to gain, and the best 
chance of gaining it, this irrational system of manipulating mandatory 
minimum sentences undermines the American system of justice. 
 
D.  The Proffer Process and the Incentive to Lie 
It is impossible to discuss the potential abuse resulting from the 
prosecution’s control over the cooperation process without looking at 
the government’s mechanism for auditioning a cooperator.  The pre-
lude to the cooperation agreement is the proffer session or, more like-
 
49
Mr. Reimer served as counsel for Mr. Savoy in this case.   
50
Their arrest was itself a manifestation of the disparity in the criminal justice sys-
tem.  All three were casually dressed African-Americans who were stopped in Penn Sta-
tion at rush hour when, according to the arresting officer, his suspicions were aroused 
because they looked nervous and appeared to be running to catch a train.  See United 
States v. Savoy, No. 98-1733, 1999 WL 980967, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 1999).  
51
Mr. Savoy was recently released after serving more than twelve years, the benefi-
ciary of the reduced cocaine/crack sentencing disparity.  
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ly, repeated sessions.  It is during those meetings that the prospective 
beneficiary of the government’s largesse must demonstrate the abili-
ty to deliver substantial assistance.  As noted above, for the most 
deeply enmeshed in criminality, this may not pose a serious prob-
lem.  But for others, there is a real danger that the government will 
find the information inadequate. 
These sessions are not conducted at arm’s length, with each side 
on a level playing field.  The government holds all the power, while 
the defendant is in a desperate situation, facing decades or even life in 
prison.  It is not long before a prospective cooperator may “improve” 
his recollection after he goes through a few hours of debriefings and 
after being told told that the information is not enough, or that it is 
not what the government hoped or expected to hear.  Unfortunately, 
these procedures are shrouded in secrecy.  Once the defendant satis-
fies the government, there is no check on the process, unless that de-
fendant is later cross-examined by another defendant’s attorney.  If 
the defendant does not satisfy the government, then there is no re-
course.  There is no independent assessment of whether the informa-
tion substantially assisted the government.  And there is no opportuni-
ty to avoid the mandatory minimum simply by trying to help.  Thus, 
the proffer meetings can become an invitation to falsify.52
Occasionally, a little sunlight illuminates the cooperation process.  
It took a white-collar case to shed light on the inherent abuse.  In 
United States v. Ruehle, a Broadcom stock option case, Judge Cormac C. 
Carney of the Central District of California became sufficiently 
alarmed to conduct an evidentiary hearing in the middle of trial.
 
53  At 
the conclusion of the hearing, he found that the government had in-
timidated and improperly influenced three witnesses critical to the de-
fense.54  Judge Carney dismissed the charges.55  He found that the ef-
fect of the misconduct with respect to the witnesses distorted the 
truth-finding process and compromised the integrity of the trial, and 
that to submit the case to the jury would have made a mockery of the 
defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process and a fair tri-
al.56
 
52
Lee, supra note 
  One aspect of his findings is particularly relevant to this essay. 
40, at 177 (“The incentive to tell the prosecutor whatever she wants 
to hear in order to reap the benefits of the substantial assistance provision is enormous.”) 
53
Transcript of Record at 5192, United States v. Ruehle, No. 08-0139 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=19574. 
54
Id. at 5201. 
55
Id. at 5199-200. 
56
Id. at 5195. 
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Nancy Tullos, the vice president of human resources, was one of 
the witnesses who could have exonerated the defendant, William J. 
Ruehle.  The court found that the prosecution put enormous pressure 
on Ms. Tullos after she refused to cooperate with the government.  But 
she eventually testified against Mr. Ruehle.  The court concluded, “I 
have absolutely no confidence that any portion of Ms. Tullos’s testimo-
ny was based on her own independent recollection of events as opposed 
to what the government thought her recollection should be on those 
events.”57
Most troubling, the government met with Ms. Tullos on 26 separate oc-
casions and subjected her to grueling interrogation during which the 
government interjected its views of the evidence and, at least on one oc-
casion, told her that she would not receive the benefits of cooperation un-
less she testified differently than she had initially in an earlier session.
  The court highlighted the process that led to its finding: 
58
This case exposes the process by which thousands of people every 
year qualify for government motions for leniency by providing “sub-
stantial assistance.” 
 
E. Cultivating Substantial Assistance 
Perhaps the most troubling permutation, and the one that has the 
most pervasive impact on minority communities, occurs when the 
prospective cooperator does not have the information necessary to 
qualify for substantial assistance, but is willing to work to provide it.  It 
is at this point that the cooperating witness becomes a confidential in-
formant, or “CI.”  This completes the circle, bringing things back to 
the law enforcement tactics discussed above.  Now the cooperator, 
whose last hope for freedom depends upon his providing new cases 
for the government, is turned back in the community with the specific 
goal of luring others into committing crimes.  Practitioners know that 
there will be no limits on whom the desperate cooperator will attempt 
to ensnare.  The authors have handled cases in which the government 
has asked brother to turn against brother, husband against wife, and 
even son against mother.  When it comes to the government’s un-
quenchable thirst for new cases, the recruitment of cooperators is sel-
dom limited by universal values. 
For years, commentators have decried the inherent injustice 
spawned by the interplay of mandatory minimum sentences and the 
 
57
Id. at 5197. 
58
Id. at 5196. 
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unchecked power of the prosecution to bargain them away.59
V.  THE SOLUTION:  A RETURN TO JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT 
  The 
process is inherently abusive.  It is time to fix it. 
When it enacted the “safety valve” provision, Congress took a small 
step toward ameliorating some of the most egregious injustices in the 
application of the mandatory minimums in federal drug laws.60
Practitioners immediately recognized the value of the safety 
valve.  But its value is far too limited, and its availability is subject to 
government manipulation. 
  It re-
moved the government’s unilateral power to invoke the provision, and 
it conditioned qualification for the relief upon a judicial determina-
tion of truthful disclosure, rather than a prosecutorial assessment of 
actual value.  This approach restores fairness and rationality to sen-
tencing.  It focuses on the defendant’s post-arrest conduct, rather 
than upon external factors over which she has no control. 
First, by definition the safety valve applies only to controlled sub-
stance offenses.  Second, the qualifying factors vastly restrict its use.  
By limiting it to persons with no more than one criminal history point, 
it bars access to many, irrespective of the relatively minor nature of 
prior conduct—potentially pushing a person into a higher criminal 
history—or whether the prior conduct is remote in time.  This factor 
also contributes to increased racial disparity.61
 
59
See e.g., Lee, supra note 
  The other limiting fac-
tors may also result in arbitrary disqualification.  Third, as noted 
above, the authorized departure is limited by the statutory obligation 
to sentence in accordance with the applicable guideline.  Even in the 
post-Booker sentencing environment, this is likely to severely limit the 
extent of the departure below the statutory minimum.  Fourth, al-
though the court must ultimately determine whether the defendant 
provided all relevant information, the government’s subjective view 
of this will usually carry great weight with the court.  Finally and 
perhaps most disturbingly, the prosecution’s unbridled charging 
40, at 122-30 (discussing the various ways in which the 
filing or nonfiling of substantial assistance motions are arbitrary and irrational, and 
providing examples of stark disparity between similarly situated defendants).  
60
Id. 
61
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 42, at 132-33 (noting the “demographic 
differences . . . in fiscal year 2010 between the rates of relief for offenders convicted of 
an offense carrying a mandatory minimum”).  
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discretion enables the government to include charges that will dis-
qualify otherwise eligible offenders.62
The system needs a general safety valve approach, but without the 
present limitations.  The system needs a return to judicial discretion 
to determine whether a person’s truthful and comprehensive post-
arrest efforts to cooperate and purge themselves of criminality warrant 
relief from a mandatory minimum sentence—and the system needs to 
give judges full authority to determine how much relief to grant. 
 
A reasonableness requirement could limit judicial discretion, and 
courts should certainly afford the government ample opportunity to 
present its recommendation.  But the discretion should not be limited 
to any class of offenses, nor should it automatically bar classes of of-
fenders.  Under the present construct, when the government chooses 
to move for a departure based upon substantial assistance, there are 
no limitations whatsoever.  No crime or crimes are barred.  No classes 
of offenders are barred.  In a reformed system, the court likewise 
should have no such restrictions. 
The authors recognize that this may be overly ambitious.  Other 
proposals seek reform in more modest ways.  Several years ago, Pro-
fessor Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee advanced a proposal to restore the 
judicial authority to determine whether a defendant deserved le-
niency for cooperation, but it would have limited the departure to 
three to five levels.63
Recently, Professors Erik Luna and Paul Cassell advanced an intri-
guing proposal that would create a new safety valve, increasing judicial 
authority and widening the availability of a departure from mandatory 
minimums.
  The problem with this approach is that it clear-
ly does not provide adequate relief.  In some cases, significant limita-
tions would discourage many from the risks of cooperation, and in 
many other cases, it would perpetuate the same arbitrariness from 
which the present system suffers. 
64  Their proposal would limit such departures to the ap-
plicable guideline range, which is a highly problematic outcome.65  In 
most cases the guideline sentence is at or higher than the mandatory 
minimum sentence.66
 
62
Luna & Cassell, supra note 
  A quarter century of disappointment in the wil-
lingness of the Sentencing Commission to ameliorate harshness in the 
guidelines makes it difficult for criminal defense practitioners to pin 
43, at 54.  
63
Lee, supra note 40, at 177-79. 
64
Luna & Cassell, supra note 43, at 60-77. 
65
Id. 
66
Id. at 73-74. 
REIMERWAYNE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  12:05 PM 
2011] From the Practioner’s Perch 177 
hopes for reform on the issuance of more humane guidelines.  Profes-
sors Luna and Cassell acknowledge that the efficacy of their minimal-
ist proposal hinges upon congressional action to invite the Sentencing 
Commission to decouple the guidelines from mandatory minimum 
penalties.67
Those who have stood beside individual defendants and have ob-
served up close and personally the tyranny of mandatory sentencing 
welcome any relief—however incremental or marginal.  It took nearly 
two decades of concerted effort to address the cruel 100:1 co-
caine/crack ratio.  And despite broad bipartisan support for the eli-
mination of the disparity and calls for reform from all three branches 
of government, reformers hailed the Fair Sentencing Act revision as a 
great triumph, though it merely reduced the ratio to 18:1. 
  Still, the minimalist proposal is laudable.  It addresses the 
core problem with how things currently operate by reinserting judicial 
discretion into a system that has become rigid, harsh, and arbitrary. 
So yes, however the progress comes, however small the steps, the 
defense bar will welcome it.  But inevitably, a sentencing regime that 
couples mandatory minimums with unfettered prosecutorial control 
must be dismantled if there is to be meaningful reform and if racial 
disparity is to be purged from the criminal justice system.  That one 
reform will ripple through the system.  It will fundamentally alter the 
means, the methods, and the tactics that drive prosecutorial and polic-
ing practices, and steer them toward a more humane and fair place. 
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Id. at 75-77. 
